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for summary judgment on the issue of whether the Declaration 
of Building and Use Restrictions permits construction of a 
chapel and whether the Declaration could be amended by a 
majority of subdivision lot owners to permit construction of 
the chapel, [R. 32, 73.] The District Court granted 
plaintiffs' motion and denied defendant's motion, enjoining 
construction of the chapel. [R. 154, Add. 1.] The 
defendant thereafter filed this appeal. [R. 157.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Montana Ranchos Subdivision ("MRS") numbers 1, 
2, and 3, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is a 
residential subdivision which was constructed during the 
early 1970's by Western Home Builders, Inc. A Declaration 
of Building and Use Restrictions was recorded on April 2, 
1973, which covered Lots 25 to 51, inclusive, of Montana 
Ranchos Subdivision Number 2. The Declaration was signed by 
Arlen Fox, President of Western Home Builders, Inc. [R. 13-
15; Add. 3-5.] 
Lot 34 of MRS No. 2 was thereafter acquired by the 
defendant subject to the Declaration of Building and Use 
Restrictions pertaining to MRS No. 2. 
In May, 1992, plaintiffs commenced this action to 
enjoin construction of a chapel contemplated by the 
defendant. On June 15, 1992, the defendant executed a 
purported amendment to the Declaration to delete a portion 
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of Lot 34 from the Declaration for the purpose of 
permitting construction of a chapel for religious worship. 
[R. 16.] The plaintiffs thereafter filed an Amended 
Complaint challenging the validity of the Amendment to the 
MRS No. 2 Declaration. [R. 9.] The defendant responded 
with an Answer and Counterclaim seeking a declaratory 
judgment confirming the validity of the Amendment. [R. 25, 
28.] 
The parties then each filed motions for summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs arguing that the Declaration 
clearly prohibited the construction of a chapel and that the 
attempted amendment by the defendant was null and void due 
to the fact that the Declarations could not be amended for 
a period of forty years from the date of recording. The 
defendant argued that the restrictive covenants were 
ambiguous and that the amendment to the Declaration was 
valid. [R. 35.] Following a hearing on the motions, the 
District Court denied the defendant's motion and granted 
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, accepting the 
plaintiffs' argument and enjoining construction of the 
chapel. [Order, R. 154, Add. 1.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court below properly granted summary judgment 
on the issues presented to it for decision. The relevant 
provisions of the Declaration of Building and Use 
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Restrictions are clear and unambiguous and no facts were in 
dispute as to those issues which would preclude summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The restrictive covenants in question clearly 
prohibit the construction of any type of building other than 
one detached single-family dwelling. Because the language 
and intent of the document is clear from the document 
itself, no resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary. 
The Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions 
amendment to the Declaration for a period of forty years 
from the date of recording, April 2, 1973. Absent unanimous 
consent of all property owners, any amendment during that 
time period is null and void. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CLEARLY AND 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY PROHIBIT THE BUILDING CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE DEFENDANT. 
Interpretation of restrictive covenants generally 
requires the application of the same rules of construction 
used to interpret contracts. Cecala vs. Thorley, 764 P.2d 
643 (Utah App. 1988). Where the terms of a covenant are 
sufficiently clear, a covenant is to be construed without 
reference to attendant facts and circumstances or extrinsic 
evidence. Revelle vs. Schultz, 759 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988). 
In interpreting contracts, courts should first look to the 
four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of 
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the parties, and the use of extrinsic evidence is permitted 
only if the document appears to incompletely express the 
parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that 
agreement, Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., vs. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . Only when an 
ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an objective 
and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole 
should resort be made to the use of extrinsic evidence. 
Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). The 
subjective intentions of the draftsmen of restrictive 
covenants are not dispositive of the intentions of the 
parties as manifested by the document. Lenhoff vs. Birch 
Bay Real Estate, 585 P.2d 1087 (Wash. App. 197 8 ) . In 
construing restrictive covenants, it is generally held that 
unambiguous language in a covenant will be given its plain 
and reasonable meaning and courts will not apply a rule of 
construction when it will defeat the obvious purpose of the 
restriction. Sandy Point Improvement Co. vs. Huber, 613 
P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1 9 8 0 ) . A contract provision is not 
necessarily ambiguous just because one party gives that 
provision a different meaning than another party does. 
Plateau Mining Co. vs. Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1 9 9 0 ) . 
-5-
In the case of Leaver vs. Grose, 563 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1977), the court stated: 
"A restrictive covenant cannot be set 
aside in the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence. And where 
covenants are duly executed and recorded 
the law gives an interested party the 
right to enforce their terms." At 775. 
Interpretation of a contract is a matter of law 
for the court to determine unless the contract is ambiguous 
and evidence of the parties' intention is necessary to 
establish the terms of the contract. Saunders vs. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991 ). 
In the instant case, the Declaration of Building 
and Use Restrictions, Part B, Paragraph 1, entitled "Land 
Use and Building Type" [R. 13.] provides, in pertinent part, 
that 
"No lot shall be used except for 
residential purposes. No building shall 
be erected, altered, placed or permitted 
to remain on any lot other than one 
detached single-family dwelling not to 
exceed two stories in height and a 
private garage and carport for not more 
than three vehicles." . . . 
This paragraph succinctly and unambiguously 
provides that the lots in the subdivision shall be dedicated 
to residential purposes only and specifies the type of 
building that may be erected on any lot. The defendant 
herein argues that the residential covenant quoted above 
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permits construction of a chapel because either the covenant 
does not unambiguously prohibit a chapel or, in the 
alternative, that the covenant is ambiguous and extrinsic 
evidence establishes intent to permit the construction of a 
chapel. As to the first argument, the covenant in question 
clearly prohibits the erection of any building other than a 
single-family dwelling. Even if the court were to agree 
that erection of a church does not run afoul of the 
"residential purposes" clause, it clearly violates the 
clause regulating building type. 
The defendant cites a number of cases in support 
of its proposition that a non-commercial use which is not 
inconsistent with residential purposes should be allowed 
under the restrictive covenant in question. All of these 
cases are distinguishable on their facts and should be 
examined closely. 
For example, in the case of Emma vs. Si 1 vestri , 
227 A. 2d 480 (R.I. 1967), the two lots in the subdivision 
which were sold for church purposes (an issue which was not 
before the court in that case) were not subject to the 
restrictions imposed on the other lots in the subdivision. 
The court's ruling in that case had nothing to do with 
ambiguity in the restrictions or with the church 
construction being consistent with the residential purposes 
restriction. 
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In Parrish vs. Richards, 336 P.2d 122 (Utah 19 5 9 ) , 
the court held that under the language of the restrictive 
covenants in question that the construction of a tennis 
court and fence did not violate the covenants since no 
building was being constructed which would block the view of 
the neighborhood, reduce the beauty of the area, or increase 
crowding of buildings. The court concluded that the term 
"structure", as used in the covenants, referred to buildings 
of solid construction. 
In St. Luke's Episcopal Church vs. Berry, 163 S.E. 
2d 664 (N.C. App. 1968), the owners of certain lots whose 
deeds contained restrictive covenants prohibiting building 
of more than one residence on a lot brought suit against the 
Church which acquired title subsequent pursuant to a deed 
which contained no such restrictions. The issue which was 
presented on the appeal was whether the lots sold to the 
Church were nevertheless bound by the restrictive covenants 
contained in the deeds to the other grantees. The Court of 
Appeals held that the decision of the trial court was proper 
that where there was no deed which expressly imposed any 
restriction on plaintiff's lots, the restrictive covenants 
did not apply. 
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In the case of Bumgarner and Bowman Building, 
Inc., vs. Hollar, 171 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. 1969) the restriction 
at issue provided that no structure should be erected on any 
lot other than one detached, single-family dwelling and that 
no trailer, shack, garage, or outbuilding should be used as 
temporary or permanent residences. The court held that 
construction of a storage shed did not violate this 
provision since it was not intended as a temporary or 
permanent residence. 
In Ziemann vs. Village of North Hudson, 298 N.W.2d 
233 Wis. App. 1980) the restrictions in question provided 
that the properties covered by the restriction should be 
used only for residential purposes and that any building 
erected on any of the lots be single-family dwellings. 
Since no buildings were being erected on the lot in 
question, but rather a park, the building restriction was 
not violated and the court concluded that a park was not 
inconsistent with residential purposes. 
The case of West Hill Baptist Church vs. Abbate, 
261 N.E.2d 196 (Oh. Com. PI. 1969) is a trial court decision 
that, using Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948 ) to 
support its reasoning, ruled that the restrictive covenants 
at issue could not be construed to prevent construction of a 
church in the area covered by the covenants. The judge took 
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note of the fact that there were already two churches in the 
restricted area and reasoned that it would be 
discriminatory, under Shelley vs. Kraemer, supra, to bar 
construction of plaintiff's church. The proposition that 
all private covenants which restrict the building of a 
church are violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States has been rejected 
by appellate courts deciding that issue. Ginsberg vs. 
Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358 NYS 2d 477 (Second Dept.), 
aff'd 36 NY2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876, 366 NYS 2d 418 (1975); 
Ireland vs. Bible Baptist Church, 480 S.W.2d 467 [Tex.3 
cert, den., Sub Norn., Bible Baptist Church vs. Ireland, 411 
U.S. 906. 
In the case of Connor vs. Clemmens, 213 S.W.2d 438 
(Ky. 1948), cited by the defendant herein, the covenants in 
question read: 
"1. The erection of any building or 
structure to be used for business 
purposes on any lot as now defined on 
the recorded Plat of the Henry Feltman 
Subdivision is prohibited. 
"2. Not more than one structure to be 
used for residential purposes shall be 
erected on any one lot as now defined on 
the recorded Plat of the Henry Feltman 
Subdivision." Id. at 439. 
The court stated that, in the absence of 
Restriction No. 1, it would adopt the construction applied 
in Dorsey vs. Fisherman's Wharf Realty Co., 207 S.W.2d 565 
-10-
(Ky. 1948) (A case which held that the words "only one 
dwelling . . ." meant that only a dwelling house could be 
constructed on any of the lots in the subdivision). The 
court concluded, however, that Restriction No. 1 created an 
ambiguity by indicating that only business uses were 
prohibited and declined to extend the scope of the 
restriction to a church. 
In Roberts vs. Congregation Shaarey Zedek, 218 
N.W. 662 (Mich. 1928), the covenant at issue read: 
"Any building erected upon said 
property shall be fifteen feet from the 
front line of said property and not less 
than one and one-half stories with 
fourteen-foot posts in height, and cost 
at least two thousand five hundred 
dollars, and no shanties or sheds shall 
be erected upon said premises to be used 
for said dwelling purposes." at 662. 
The court held that there was nothing in that 
language that prevented the erection of a synagogue, 
stati ng: 
"Restrictions on the use of real 
property ought not to rest in parol. 
Where building restrictions have been 
deliberately put in writing, in plain 
and unambiguous terms, they are so 
conclusively presumed to contain the 
whole agreement between the parties that 
parol evidence is inadmissible to 
contradict or vary their terms." 
[citations omitted] Id. at 663. 
The case of F1inkingshelt vs. Johnson, 187 S.E.2d 
233 (S.C. 1972) cited by defendant, does not involve 
construction of a chapel, as defendant seems to imply. The 
-11-
court held in that case that where there was no breakdown in 
the general scheme of restrictions or a substantial 
violation or disregard of the restrictions within the 
restricted area, property owners were not entitled to have 
restrictive covenants declared void, even though 
unrestricted adjacent property was commercially developed. 
The case of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
vs. Statham, 254 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1979) is also 
distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the restrictive 
covenant in question provided: 
"No lot shall be divided in any 
manner but shall remain intact as a 
single-family residential unit, except 
upon the express written consent of John 
R. Carl isle." 
The grantor in fact had consented to the waiver of 
that covenant in the deed to the Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop and the Georgia Supreme Court held that the 
restriction did not preclude the construction of the church. 
In short, none of the cases cited by the defendant 
support the proposition that defendant advances in this case 
- that a chapel can be constructed on Lot 34 of Montana 
Ranchos Subdivision No. 2 without violating the restrictive 
covenants. The language in the covenant in question is 
neither unclear nor ambiguous. It expressly prohibits the 
construction contemplated by the defendant. This is not a 
case where the question to be decided is whether the 
-12-
covenant in issue is a "use" covenant or a "construction" 
covenant. In the case of Freeman vs. Gee, 423 P.2d 155 
(Utah 1967), the court considered this precise issue where 
the covenant at issue provided that: 
11
 . . . [N]o structure shall be 
erected, altered, placed or permitted to 
remain on any such 'residential lot' 
other than one detached, single-family 
dwelling not to exceed two stories in 
height . . ." at 157. 
The Utah Supreme Court, after considering numerous 
cases from other jurisdictions, with contradictory opinions, 
held that: 
"[I]n the case at bar . . . the 
stated provisions in Covenant I, namely, 
that 'no structure shall be erected, 
altered, placed or permitted to remain 
on any such "residential lot" other than 
one detached single-family dwelling,' 
relate to use after construction as well 
as to what may be initially erected." at 
164. 
The court in Freeman vs. Gee, supra, also rejected 
the argument asserted by the defendant in this case that 
certain other provisions of the covenants, considered alone, 
contradicted the "single-family dwelling" limitation, 
thereby creating ambiguity. The court responded to this 
argument, saying, 
"The so-called use covenant should be 
examined in the light of the intended 
use of each lot, namely, residential 
purposes. Covenant V provides that no 
noxious or offensive trade or activity 
shall be carried on upon any lot nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may 
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become an annoyance or nuisance to other 
occupants; Covenant VI prohibits the use 
of trailers, basements, tents, shacks, 
garages, or other outbuildings from 
being used as a residence; Covenant VIII 
prohibits the erection or display of 
signs, billboards or advertising 
structures upon the lots; Covenant IX 
prohibits the throwing or dumping of 
trash, ashes, or other refuse on the 
lots. If these four covenants alone are 
a measure of the prohibitive uses of 
each lot, then one can only say that any 
use of a 'detatched single-family 
dwelling' erected thereon which does not 
fall within the ambit 'noxious or 
offensive trade or activity,' or which 
does not become 'an annoyance or 
nuisance' to other occupants, or which 
does not consist of posting signs or 
dumping rubbish, is permissible, 
regardless of what it may be. If 
Covenant I is not a 'use' restriction, 
how can the 'single-family dwellings' or 
the duplexes where permitted, be 
restricted to residential use if 
prohibited uses are to be found only in 
Covenants V, VI, VIII, and IX? Do not 
these restrictions more properly 
restrict conduct rather than go to 
the nature of the occupancy and the type 
of use permitted?" Id. at 160-161. 
In the case at bar, the covenant in question 
addresses both use and construction. There is no ambiguity. 
As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in Crowley vs. 
Knapp, 288 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1980): 
"[0]nly the 
expressly set 
relevant . . . 
intent of 
forth 
[0]ne 
the grantor 
in the covenant 
does 
amorphous general intent 
the meaning c 
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words used." 
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Similarly, the very words used in the Declaration 
of Building and Use Restrictions of Montana Ranchos 
Subdivision No. 2, read as a whole, contain no 
inconsistencies. Part B. 10 of the Declaration [R. 14.] 
allows pets, livestock and poultry, "such as are generally 
associated with estate-type living and which are kept only 
for family use and/or food production and not for commercial 
purposes." . . . This is not inconsistent with the 
restriction limiting use of the property to residential 
purposes. Likewise, Part B. 8, which prohibits temporary 
structures from being used on any of the lots as a temporary 
or permanent residence is not ambiguous and is not 
contradictory to Part B. 1. [R. 13-15; Add. 3.] 
The defendant also asserts that the very fact that 
Lot 34 is significantly larger than the other lots in the 
subdivision creates an ambiguity. However, if the covenants 
are read as a whole, the size of Lot 34 is entirely 
consistent with "estate-type living" and the provision for 
livestock and horses. If this court determined that 
extrinsic evidence were necessary to resolve the perceived 
ambiguity, then the testimony introduced by the plaintiffs 
in the case below by the affidavits of Don Adams and Oack 
Lochhead [R. 104-107.3 would become relevant to rebut the 
argument f the defendant that the intention of Arlen Fox, 
was only to restrict commercial and industrial development. 
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In the event that this court were to agree with 
the defendant's argument that the covenants are ambiguous, 
the evidence which the defendant proffered below to prove 
the intentions of the parties consists of an affidavit 
signed by Arlen Fox, deceased, the President of Western Home 
Builders, Inc., the owner and sub-divider of Montana Ranchos 
Subdivision No. 2 [R. 68.] and the person who signed the 
Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions (as President 
of Western Home Builders, Inc.) which pertained to that 
subdi vi si on . 
It was the plaintiffs' contention in the court 
below that the affidavit of Arlen Fox was inadmissible 
hearsay under Rules 804(a)(4) and 804(b)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. While this issue is not reached by the 
trial judge in deciding the respective motions for summary 
judgment, this issue will certainly arise if the case is 
remanded for disposition. 
Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
so-called "residual hearsay exceptions" provides as follows: 
"The following are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
"(5) A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines 
that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other 
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evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable effort; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served 
by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless 
the proponent makes known to the adverse 
party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare 
to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, 
including the name and address of the 
dec!arant." 
Rule 804(b)(5) is a "catch-all" provision, which 
was added to the Federal Rules of Evidence by Congress when 
those rules were adopted. The provision was not intended to 
throw open a wide door for the entry of judicially-created 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. In fact, it is clear from 
the Senate's Advisory Committee Report, that the new 
exceptions were to be narrowly construed: 
"It is intended that the residual 
hearsay exceptions will be used very 
rarely, and only in exceptional 
circumstances. The Committee does not 
intend to establish a broad license for 
trial judges to admit hearsay statements 
that do not fall within one of the other 
exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 
8 0 4 ( b ) . The residual exceptions are not 
meant to authorize major judicial 
revisions of the hearsay rule, including 
its present exceptions. Such major 
revisions are best accomplished by 
legislative actions. It is intended 
that in any case in which evidence is 
sought to be admitted under these sub-
sections, the trial judge will exercise 
no less care, reflection 
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and caution than the courts did under 
the common law in establishing the now 
recognized exceptions to the hearsay 
rule." S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 
2nd Sess. 1, 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Ad. News 7051, 7066. 
In Huff vs. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286 (7th 
Cir. 1979), a leading case addressing the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence under Rule 804(b)(5), the court considered 
the admissibility of a statement made by a decedent 
reporting the events of an accident that he had been 
involved in two or three days earlier. The court listed 
five requirements that must be met for evidence to be 
admissible under the residual exception. The first of these 
is trustworthiness. The court stated that, 
"The circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness on which the various 
specific exceptions to the hearsay rule 
are based are those that existed at the 
time the statement was made and do not 
include those that may be added by using 
hindsight. Evidence admissible under 
the residual exception must have 
'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.' [Citations omitted] 
Therefore, the guarantees to be 
considered in applying that exception 
are those that existed when the 
statement was made." at 292. 
The "equivalent circumstantial guarantees" refers 
to the other exceptions delineated under Rule 804(b). The 
court in Huff vs. White Motor Corp., supra, noted that the 
decedent's statement in that case was an unambiguous and 
explicit report of the events he had experienced two or 
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three days earlier. It contained neither opinion nor 
speculation. The decedent was not being interrogated, so 
there was no reason to give any explanation of how the 
accident happened unless he wanted to do so. There was no 
reason for him to invent the story because it was contrary 
to his pecuniary interest and there was no reason why the 
witness in that case, a friend and relative by marriage, 
would have manufactured the story. Id. at 292. 
In the case before this court, the affidavit which 
the defendant proposes to offer into evidence is an 
affidavit that was procured by David Evans, an agent and 
representative of the defendant, who has filed an affidavit 
herein. [R. 114.] The affidavit of Arlen Fox appears to 
have been prepared by Mr. Evans, in advance of his interview 
with Arlen Fox, now deceased, and was procured obviously in 
anticipation of the litigation and the issues that are 
raised in this case. The affidavit does not have equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness such as those 
that pertain to testimony given as a witness at another 
hearing of the same or different proceeding, a statement 
under belief of impending death, a statement against 
interest, or a statement of personal or family history. In 
fact, it appears that the affidavit was obtained solely to 
further the interests of the defendant and would be 
inherently suspect for that reason. All of the standard 
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reasons for excluding such testimony are present in this 
case, Mr. Fox cannot now be cross-examined or confronted 
with respect to the affidavit and it should not be admitted 
under Rule 804(b)(5). 
The second requirement of admissibility is that 
the statement be offered as evidence of a material fact. As 
plaintiff has previously argued herein, the subjective 
intention of Arlen Fox is not a material fact and the court 
should look to the document itself in determining the rights 
of the parties. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., 
vs. Blomquist, supra. 
The third requirement is the probative importance 
of the evidence. To be admissible under the residual 
exception, the statement must be more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence that the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. Inasmuch 
as the Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions at issue 
in this case were signed by Arlen Fox, as President of 
Western Home Builders, Inc., "by authority of resolution of 
its Board of Directors," [R. 15.] The best and most 
probative evidence on this issue would be a copy of the 
minutes of the board of directors of that corporation 
relating to this transaction. 
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The fourth requirement for the admissibility of 
such hearsay is that it be admitted only if doing so will 
best serve the general purposes of the rules of evidence and 
the interests of justice. The circumstances under which the 
affidavit in question was obtained are inherently suspect 
and the admission of that document would not serve the 
interests of justice and does not assist the court in 
ascertaining the truth in this matter. 
The final requirement of the residual hearsay 
exception, notification, is not an issue in this case. 
POINT II: THE DECLARATION OF BUILDING AND USE RESTRICTIONS 
CANNOT BE AMENDED FOR A PERIOD OF FORTY YEARS FROM 
THE DATE OF RECORDING. 
Part D. f 1 of the Declaration of Building and Use 
Restrictions of MRS2 [R. 15.] provides: 
"1. Term. These covenants are to 
run with the land and shall be binding 
on all parties and all persons claiming 
under them for a period of forty years 
from the date these covenants are 
recorded, after which time said 
covenants shall be automaticaly extended 
for successive periods of ten years 
unless an instrument signed by a 
majority of the then owners of the lots 
has been recorded, agreeing to change 
said covenants in whole or in part." 
The defendant argues that the phrase, "unless an 
instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the 
lots has been recorded, agreeing to change said covenants in 
whole or in part," modifies the entire sentence and allows 
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amendment of the covenants even during the initial forty-
year period. The trial court rejected this argument, 
pointing out that such a construction would render the 
reference to an initial forty-year period meaningless if the 
covenants could be amended at any time. Several courts 
confronting this issue have reached the same conclusion. 
In Johnson vs. Howells, 682 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 
1984), the court considered restrictive covenants containing 
a provision that they were binding on all property owners 
for a period of twenty years, after which time they would be 
automatically extended for a successive twenty-year period 
unless an instrument signed by sixty percent of the then 
owners had been recorded agreeing to change the covenants in 
whole or in part. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the trial 
court's ruling that the clause "unless an instrument has 
been recorded agreeing to change said covenants" modified 
the first phrase as well as the subsequent phrase, stating: 
"We consider the crucial phrase to be 
'after which time'. The plain meaning 
of the paragraph in question is that the 
covenants will be binding for twenty 
years, after whi ch time they are 
automatically extended unless sixty 
percent of the property owners agree to 
change them. . . . 
"To interpret the paragraph in 
question as the trial court did would be 
to render meaningless the reference 
therein to a twenty-year period. If the 
owners had intended that the covenants 
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could be amended at any time by sixty 
percent of the owners, they would not 
have needed to include any reference to 
a twenty-year period." at 505. 
In the case of White vs. Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 615 
(Ark. 1972), the restrictive covenants in question were 
binding for twenty-five years, after which they could be 
automatically extended for successive periods of ten years 
unless an instrument agreeing to change had been signed by a 
majority of owners of the lots. The court held that the 
covenants could not be changed during the twenty-five-year 
period even with the agreement of a majority of the property 
owners in the subdivision. 
In Robinson vs. Morris, 272 So.2d 444 (La. App. 
1973) the court held that where the clear and unambiguous 
terms of the restrictive coventants provided that they would 
run with the land for thirty-five years and thereafter for 
successive ten-year periods unless a majority of lot owners 
agreed to change them, the defendant, who owned a majority 
of the lots, could not amend or terminate the restrictions 
until the primary term of thirty-five years had elapsed. 
In the Utah case of Freeman vs. Gee, supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court peripherally considered an amendment 
clause similar in wording to that in the instant case, in 
conjunction with the issue of "residential use" presented in 
that case. The court noted: 
-23-
"Covenant X of the restrictions 
provides that all covenants and 
restrictions therein stated shall run 
with the land and shall be binding on 
all parties claiming any interest in the 
lots until twenty-five years from April 
25, 1952, and longer by ten-year 
intervals unless a majority of the 
owners otherwise agree after the twenty-
five-year period. Covenant XI provides 
that if any party having an interest in 
any lot shall violate or attempt to 
violate any of the covenants and 
restrictions prior to twenty-fi ve years 
from the date thereof, any other person 
owning any other lot can prosecute an 
action to either prevent such violation 
or recover damages for it. Thus the 
intent that the subdivision should be 
maintained for 'single-family' occupancy 
for at least twenty-five years seems 
clear and unambiguous." at 160. 
In Leaver vs. Grose, supra, the restrictive 
covenants provided that the covenants were enforceable for a 
period of twenty-five years and thereafter were 
automatically extended for successive periods of ten years, 
unless a vote of the majority of owners altered the 
restrictions. The covenants also contained a provision that 
persons owning properties and aggrieved by any violation during 
the twenty-five-year period could prosecute actions at law 
or in equity, but made no provision for legal action after 
the expiration of such time. The trial court ruled that the 
covenants were no longer enforceable in an action brought 
more than twenty-five years after the covenants were 
recorded. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that the 
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paragraph in question was mere surplusage and not a 
necessary part of the restrictive covenants since it could 
not prevent a suit from being filed by an aggrieved person 
in any event because of the constitutional right afforded by 
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The defendant argues that amendment provisions 
such as the one at issue in this case are typically 
interpreted to allow amendment at any time, including the 
initial period. The defendant cites the case of Meyerland 
Community Improvement Association vs. Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263 
(Tex. App. 1985) as an example. In that case, the 
restrictive covenants provided that, after passage of 
twenty-five years, a majority of the then existing owners 
could change the covenants in whole or in part. The issue 
in the case, on appeal, was whether an amendment executed 
after the twenty-five-year period had to be consistent with 
the general plan of development. The court held that it did 
not, commenting, 
"CI]n construing a contractual 
provision, it is the objective and not 
the subjective intent of the parties 
that must be ascertained; it is the 
intent expressed or apparent in the 
writing that controls." at 267. 
Another case on which defendant relies to support 
its argument for allowing amendment at any time is Schmi dt 
vs. Ladner Construction Co., 370 So. 2nd 970 (Ala. 1979 ) . 
The covenants in question in that case, however, contained a 
-25-
provision allowing the covenants to be changed at any time 
if the declarant consented and agreed to each such change in 
wri ti ng. 
The covenants at issue in the case at bar contain 
no provision for allowing an amendment at any time, and, 
unlike the ambiguity present in Leaver vs. Grose, supra, the 
covenants in this case are clear that the covenants may be 
enforced at any time. [See Part D. 11 2, R. 15.] Because 
the covenants are not ambiguous, it was not necessary for 
the court below to consider extrinsic evidence. Those cases 
cited by defendant which look to the parties' course of 
conduct or the parties' own interpretation of the contract 
are inapposite. There are no "parties" to the original 
covenants in the sense that these cases speak of parties. 
Unless there exist corporate minutes or the like which 
relate to the covenants in question, determining the 
intentions of the declarant will be very difficult, if not 
impossible. In any event, it is not necessary in this case 
to look outside the four corners of the document. The 
objective intent expressed in the clear language of the 
document is that the covenants may not be amended for a 
period of forty years. No other interpretation is plausible 
without ignoring the language of the covenants altogether. 
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence, the 
covenants should be enforced as written. Leaver vs. Grose, 
supra. 
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POINT III: THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CONSTITUTE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF ALL OWNERS OF PROPERTY IN 
THE RESTRICTED AREA WHICH CANNOT BE ABROGATED 
WITHOUT UNANIMOUS CONSENT. 
Restrictions as to use of land are mutual, 
reciprocal, equitable easements in the nature of servitudes 
in favor of owners of property within the restricted area 
which constitute property rights that run with the land. 
Montoya vs. Barreras, 473 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1970). Unless 
expressly stated, the courts generally hold that existing 
prohibitions contained in restrictive covenants cannot be 
amended or terminated without the consent of all parties 
affected by such restrictions, or their successors. 5 
Powell on Real Property, 1F 677. 
The purpose of restrictive covenants is well 
stated in Montoya vs. Barreras, supra: 
"Hi storically, restrictive covenants 
have been used to assure uniformity of 
development and use of a residential 
area to give the owners of lots within 
such an area some degree of 
environmental stability. To permit 
individual lots within an area to be 
relieved of the burden of such 
covenants, in the absence of a clear 
expression in the instrument so 
providing, would destroy the right to 
rely on restrictive covenants which has 
traditionally been upheld by our law of 
real property." at 365. 
Montoya vs. Barreras is instructive in that the 
issue in the case was the validity of a final decree that 
relieved and excluded from the burden of residential 
restrictions and covenants one lot owned by the plaintiff in 
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that case. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 
restrictive covenants did not permit changes as to only one 
lot, saying, 
"The original restrictions were 
clearly imposed on all of the described 
property, and though the restrictions 
themselves may be changed in whole or in 
part, the change or changes which might 
be made must affect all of the described 
property," Id. at 365. 
Similarly, in LaEsperanza Townhome Association, 
Inc., vs. Title Security Agency of Arizona, 689 P.2d 178 
(Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an 
amendment to covenants was void and of no force and effect 
since it did not affect the subdivision uniformly but sought 
to exempt only a portion of it from all covenants. 
In the case of Crimmins vs. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 
(Utah 1981), the defendants in that case appealed from a 
decree permanently enjoining them from operating a beauty 
salon in their home in violation of a restrictive covenant 
which was recorded in 1962. The term of that restriction 
was twenty-five years, followed by automatic ten-year 
renewal unless modified by a majority of the owners. Prior 
to the opening of their salon, the defendants had circulated 
an agreement, ultimately signed by thirty-four or thirty-
five of the forty-five owners in the plat, which recited the 
desire of the signers to change the covenants to allow a 
business to be conducted within the confines of a single-
family resi dence . 
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While Justice Oaks, the author of the opinion in 
Crimmins vs. Simonds, supra, did not directly address the 
obvious fact that the purported amendment in that case took 
place within the original twenty-five-year period, he seems 
to have implicitly taken it into account, in stating: 
"Though a unanimous modification may 
effectively alter a restrictive 
covenants agreement, [citations 
omitted], the modification in this case 
was not unanimous and thus does not 
nullify the original covenant 
prohibiting trade or business in the 
area. Persons who own property in a 
neighborhood subject to restrictive 
covenants are entitled to rely on the 
covenants according to their terms, even 
if some of their neighbors no longer 
desire their enforcement." Id. at 480-
481 . 
In the case before this court, the plaintiffs 
purchased their respective properties subject to the 
restrictive covenants duly recorded against the property. 
Their properties are burdened with the limitations of those 
restrictions as well as enjoyment of the resulting benefits. 
A reading of the Declaration of Building and Use 
Restrictions [R. 13-15.] reveals a general intent to 
restrict the buildings in the area of the restrictions to 
single-family residences and to restrict the use of the 
property to residential uses, with the further provision for 
the keeping of pets, poultry and livestock such as would be 
consistent with "estate-type living." [R. 14 1f 10.] The 
plaintiffs and other owners within the restricted area 
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acquired the right to expect that the general character of 
the neighborhood would continue to reflect the unambiguous 
intention expressed by the language of the covenants that 
only single-family residential construction would prevail in 
the area, at least until the year 2013. The defendants have 
advanced no compelling authority or facts which would 
dictate that the covenants be declared unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this court should affirm 
the Order of the District Court which enjoined the 
construction of a chapel on Lot 34 of Montana Ranchos 
Subdivision No. 2. 
DATED this day of March, 1993. 
Respectfully submi tted, 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appel1ees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEP 2 <* £92 
JOHN F. COLLINS, JR., and JUNE M. 
COLLINS; MICHAEL WIGGINS and 
SANDRA WIGGINS; P. G. TAYLOR and 
LEAH TAYLOR; GAMES W. SCHUETT and 
LESLEY A. DAVIES, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOPRIC OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 920902511 PR 
Judge: Moffat 
This matter came on for hearing on the 4th day of September, 1992, 
the Honorable Richard Moffat, District Judge presiding, Franklin L. Slaugh 
appearing as attorney for the plaintiffs, and B. Lloyd Poelman appearing as 
attorney for the defendant, and the Court having reviewed the cross-motions 
for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively, 
and having reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties in support of their 
respective motions and in opposition to the opposing parties' motion, and 
the Court having heard the oral argument of respective counsel and being 
fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as follows: 
Addendum Page 1 
1. That there is no issue as to any material fact in this case. 
2. That the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language in Part 
D, sub-paragraph 1, of the Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions of 
Montana Ranchos Subdivision No. 2, is that the covenants cannot be amended 
for a period of forty years from the date of recording, April 2, 1973. 
3. That, as a matter of law, the Amendment of Building and Use 
Restrictions of Montana Rachos Subdivision No. 2, dated June 15, 1992, and 
recorded June 16, 1992, as Entry No. 5274543 of the Records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, is null and void and of no legal effect. 
4. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The defendant, its 
servants, agents and employees, are hereby enjoined from commencing 
construction of the religious meetinghouse on the following-described real 
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
All of LOT 34, Montana Ranchos Subdivision No. 2, except 
a parcel described as Beginning at the Southeast Corner 
of LOT 34, Montana Ranchos Subdivision No. 2, as shown 
by the Official Plat and the Records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office, and running thence South 89° 
58' 15" West along the North right of way line of Alia 
Panna Way 325.645 feet to an existing fence corner; 
thence North 0° 37' 53" East along said existing fence 
175.68 feet; thence North 89° 47' 16" East 324.815 feet 
to the East line of said LOT 34; thence South 0° 21' 28" 
West along said East line 176.71 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
DATED this day of 
rY' ;. , \ I P , , 2 ^ 
'*L QZs.\}umZ:Fi G'.J ""LE \H T l i c TH.it.; 
.7 r;rYi!37 Sill 7 ;OunT, ALT LAKE COUIJTY, ^JSfistri/tz Cou/t OXi 
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-o^ccrr» : cr.c SuiMcrs, Inc. 
£ s c a l a r . c c D r i v e $ Olari Wi/w,« 
Candy, -;:a*. b'iO/0 10 / f f ? i V / 
Attn: Arlcn Fox 
Ra^*aA?R2 1973 - > V / , 
* ' u X w L / . V i DECLARATION OF BUILDING AND VSZ RESTRICTION^*** •* SFCURfTY Ting COMPANV 
AK*dtr, S*lt U U , W ^tJ^Wi »•» Ulr,C«unty, UU*» 
PART A. PREAMBLE t^Z^/V ly ^ > V
 p 
K?«W ALL HEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
THAT WHEREAS, the undersigned, being the owners of the following described real 
property located in Sandy City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah: 
Lots 25 to 51, Inclusive, MONTANA RANCHOS SUBDIVISION NO, 2, according to the 
plat thereof, at recorded in the office of the County Recorder of aald County. 
do heteby establish the nature of the cse and enjoynent of all lots in said subdivision 
and do -ieciore that all conveyances of laid lots shall be oade subject to the following 
conditions, restrictions and stipulations: 
PART B. RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS 
1. Land Use and Building Type. Nc lot shall be used except for residential purposes. 
No building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot ether 
than ore detached single-family dvelliag not to exceed two stories in height and a 
private garage and carpcrt for nor more than three vehicles. All construction to be 
of new material*, and to be approved by Architectural Control Committee. 
2. Architectural Control. No bi/ildin| ohall be erected, placed, or altered on any 
lot until th-s construction plans and specifications and a plan showing the location 
of the structure have been approved by the Architectural Control Causalttea. as to 
quality of workmanship and materials, lanaony of external design with existing 
structures, and as to location with respect to topography and finish grade elevation. 
No iencc or wall shall be erected, pieced or altered on any lot nearer to m y street 
than the minimum building setback line unless similarly approved. Approval shall be 
»$ provided in Par: C. 
3. Dwelling Cost, Quality Jnd Size. So dwelling shall be permitted on any lot at 
a cost of less thar. $28,000.00 including lot, based upon cost levels prevailing on 
the date chose covenant* are recorded, it being the intention and purpose of the 
covenants to assure that all dwellings shall be of a quality of workmanship and 
materia la substantially the s.imo or better than that which can be produced on the 
date those covenants are recorded at tie minimum cost stated herein for the minimum 
pormlttod dwelling site. The ground floor arty of the main structure, exclusive of 
one-story open porches and garages, shall ba not less than 1200 square feet for a 
one-story dwelling, nor lets than 1000 square feat for a dwelling of more than one 
story, 
4. Building Locstlon, 
(a) No building shall be located an any l o t nearer to the front l o t l ine or 
nearer to the side s t ree t l ine than the minimum building setbeck l i n e s shown on the 
recorded p la t . In any event no buildiag shal l ba ioeated on any l o t nearer then 30 
fcot to the front lot l i n e , or nearer Than 20 feat to any side s t r e e t l i n e , 
(b) No building shal l be located nearer than 8 feat to any in ter ior l o t l i n e , 
except thot a one-foot minimum side yard shal l ba required for a gsrsge or other 
permitted accessory building located Sf f ee t or more from the minimum building s e t -
buck l ino . No building shs i l be loc i tad on any inter ior l o t nearer than 15 faet 
to the roar l o t l ine , 
(c) For the purpose of this covenant, eaves , s t eps , and open porches shal l not 
be considered as a part o£ a bui lding, provided, however, that t h i s sha l l not ba 
conatrucd to permit any portion of a betiding on a l o t to encroach upon another l o t . 
5. Lot Area and Width. No dwelling stal l ba erected or placed on any lo t having 
a width of l e s s than 100 feet at the alalasua building setback l i n e nor shel l any 
dwelling be erected or placed en any Ut having an area of laaa than 17,000 square 
feot , except that a dwelling may ba arte tad or placed on a l l corner and cul-de-sac 
l o t s , as «ho VTA on the recorded p l a t , ponrided that the above front and side yerd 
clearances are maintained. £\ 
6, Easement, Easements for Instal lat ion and SM in tana nee of u t i l i t i e s and drainage U> 
f a c i l i t i e s are reserved as shown on tha recorded p la t and over the rear f ive faat ^ ' 
of aach l o t . Within theae easements, to etructure, planting or other mattrial sha l l £ 
ba placed or permitted to remain which e*y dataage or interfare with tha i n s t a l l a t i o n 
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and nuintcnance of utilities, or whi li may change the direction of flov of drainigt 
channels In the easements* or which cay obstruct cr retard the flov ot wutcr through 
drainage channels in the easements. The easement area of each lot and ail improvements 
In it shall be maintained continuously by the enmer of the lot, except for those 
improvements for which a public authority or utility company is responsible. 
7. Nulsanr.es. No noxious or offensive activity shall bo carried on upon any lot, nor 
shall anything t« done thereon which may ba or may become an annoyance or nuisance to 
the neighborhood. No clothe* drylnp, or storage of any arciclr* which ave unpightly in 
the opinion of t!.c Architectural Control Committee will be permitted in carports, 
unless in enclosed areas built and designed for such purpose. No automobiles, trailers, 
boato, or other vehicles are to be stOTed on streets or front and side lots unless they 
are in running condition, properly licensed end are being regularly used. 
8. Temporary Structures No structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, 
tent, shack, garage, bain or other outbuildings shall be used on any lot ac any time 
tL9 a residence either temporarily or permanently. 
9. Signs. No sign of any kind shall *e displayed to the public view on any lot 
exceor. one professional sign of not mora than on* square foot, ono sign of not more 
Chan five square fent advertising the property for sale or rent, or signs used by a 
builder to advertise the property during the conitruction and sales period, 
10. ?eta, Livestock & Poultry. Such rs ere generally associated with estate-type 
living and which are kept only for family use and/or food production and not for any 
commercial purpose are permitted on ail lots, except that mink, swine and goate are not 
permitted on any lot, temporarily or permanently. However, there shall be permitted no 
more than two head of cattle In any combination of not more than six heed of horse or 
cattli. All permitted animals and fowl to be adequately maintained In a sanitary and 
hea'lnful manner. 
11. Garbage and Refuse Disposal. No lot shall bo used or maintained as e dumping 
cround for rubbish. Trash, garbage or other vaste shell not be kept excopt in sanitary 
containers. All incinerators or other equipment for the storage or disposal of such 
material shall be kept in a clean ind sanitary condition. Each lot and Its abutting 
•tract aro to be kept free of trash, weeds and other refuse by the lot owner. No 
unsightly materials or other objects aro to be scorod on any lot In view of the general 
public. 
12. Sight Distance at Xntcvfcctlon, Xo fence, wall, hodga or shrub planting which 
obstructs sight lines et eiovar.ion;! between 2 and 6 feet above ttae roadways shall bo 
placed or permitted to remain on snv corner lot within the triangular area formed by 
chc street property lines and a Une connecting them i- point* 25 fe<>t from tho Inter-
section of the street lines, or In case of e rounded property comer from the intersection 
of the Ktvect Property lines extenoed. The same sight-line limitations shall apply on 
any lot within 10 feet from the intersection of a street property line with the edge of a 
driveway or alley pavemont. No tree shall be permitted to remain within auch distances 
of such intersections unless the foliage U n e is maintained at sufficient height to 
prevent obstruction of such sight lines. 
13. Oil and Mining Operations. No oil drilling, oil development operations, oil 
roflning, quarrying or mining operatlooa of any kind shall be permitted upon or In any 
lot, nor shall oil wells, tanks, tunnele, mineral excavations or shafts be permitted 
upon or in any lot. No derrick or other structure designed for use in boring for oil 
or natural gas shall be erected, maintained or permitted upon any lot. 
14. Landscaping. Trees, lawns, shrubs or other plantings provided by the developer 
shall be properly nurtured and maintalaed or replaced at the property owner's expense 
upon request of the Architectural Control Committee, 
15. Slope and Drainage Control, No structure, planting or other material shell be 
placed or permitted to remain or othur activities undertaken which may damage or inter-
fere with astabliahed slope ratios, create erosion or sliding problems, or which may 
change the direction of flow of dralfMfe channels or obstruct or retard the flov of water 
through drainage channels. The slope control areee of each lot and all improvements 
In thorn shall ba maintained continuously by the owner of the lot, except for thoae 
improvements for which a public authority or utility company la responsible. 
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PART C. ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL COWITTEE 
1. Membership. A majority of the committee may designate a representative to act 
for it. In the event of death or resignation of any member of the committee, the, 
retaining members of the committee shall have full authority to select s successor. 
Neither the members ef the committee, nor its designated representative shell be 
entitled to any compensation for services performed pursuant to this covenant' 
At any time, the then record ovnere of a majority of the lots shall have the power 
through a duly recorded written instrument to change the membership of the committee 
or to withdraw from the committee or restore to it any of its powers and duties. 
The Architectural Control Committee is composed of Arlen Fox, Wiiford Hansen, 
Janice Fox and Jill Hansen. 
2. Procedure. 7 u Committee's approval or disapproval MB required in these 
covenants shall be in writing. In the event the committee, or its designated 
representative, falls to approve 01 disapprove within 30 days sfter plans and 
specifications have been submitted to it, or in any event, if no suit to enjoin 
the construction has been commenced prior to the completion thereof, approval will 
not be required, and the related covenants shall be deemed to have been fully complied 
with. 
PART D. CENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. Term. These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all 
parties and all persons claiming under them for a period of forty yearn from the 
date these covenants are recorded, after which time ssld covenants shall be auto-
matically extended for successive periods of ten. years unlets in instrument signed 
by a majority of the then owners of the lota haa been recorded, agreeing to change 
said covenants in whole or in part* 
2. Enforcement. Enforcement shall be by proceedings at law or in equity against 
any person or persons violating or attempting to violate any covenant either to 
restrain violation or to recover damages. 
3. Severability. Invalidation of any one of these covenants by judgment or court 
order shall, in no vise affect any of the other provisions which shall remain in 
full force and effect. 
WESTERN HOKE BUILDERS, INC. 
Bv f^C<^^>i^^:' 
Arlen Fox, President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT IAYX) 
On the 2nd day of Apri l , 1973 personally appeared before me ARLE* FOX, who 
being by tne duly sworn did say, that he, the said ARLEN FOX i s the President of 
WESTERN
 %H8#WWILDERS, INC,, and that the within and foregoing, instrument was signed 
in b^hi'Vffoi^ir^ corporation by authority of a reaolution of i t a board of directors 
a Q ^ V ^ . A R U ^ r $ > duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same 
/ftd that the s'tfavt Affixed i s the seal of said corporation. 
\ ^OO U C . : ' I "NOTARY PUUIC ' 
Hy C$^**l*rfaik?iT** L'~ V " 7 ^ Residing in Sa l t Lake City, Utah 
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